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4abstract
It is a commonplace observation in innovation and research policy 
that the ‘linear model’ of innovation is dead; even if it continues to 
influence policy thinking and practice. A more current perspective 
is to see innovation and research as parts of a complex ‘national 
innovation system’, in which innovation processes can start anywhere 
(not necessarily with R&D) and where new knowledge production 
contributes to the ‘stock’ of knowledge used in innovation. Recognising 
this and the increasing importance of networks in research and 
innovation, research and innovation policy interventions have become 
increasingly complex. The Framework Programme is a leading example. 
In principle, states play a role in research and innovation policy in order 
to combat market and systems failures. These interventions should 
increase the volume and quality of research and the rate of innovation 
generating knowledge and economic spillovers for the benefit of society. 
The Framework Programme has been an important instrument of EU 
policy through which the nascent European state has begun to modify 
and assume some of the developmental roles formerly tackled at the 
Member State level, ultimately with the aim of creating an innovation 
system optimised at the European rather than the national level. This has 
involved successive extensions to the role of the Framework Programme. 
While formally a single programme, the Framework is in fact a 
composite of many sub-programmes addressing different themes 
and their associated goals. It is nonetheless possible to generate a 
high-level description of its intervention logic and identify common 
long-term goals. Existing evaluation evidence tells us that the 
Framework Programme funds high-quality, pre-competitive R&D, 
mostly producing ‘intermediate knowledge products’ that can later 
be used in R&D and various kinds of networks as well as to increase 
competitivity. To a considerable extent, its design reflects the needs 
and interests of important stakeholders and R&D communities in 
Europe. Its longer-term effects go beyond these, crucially including 
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5setting agendas, creating road maps and coordinating the efforts of 
research communities. This can lead to the emergence of new fields 
and technological trajectories, restructuring of the European research 
effort, improvements in policymaking and increased competitiveness. 
This paper details the impact mechanisms through which this is 
achieved. 
Future RTD policy at the European level will become more holistic, 
combining innovation and research policy to a greater degree, even 
if we do not see the kind of government-wide integrative governance 
mechanisms visible at national level. The role of coordination seems 
likely to become even more important, posing important problems 
of management and governance. Understanding the continuing and 
longer term impacts of EU policy at this level will require innovation 
in governance mechanisms and in newer kinds of evaluation tools 
that can take better account of governance and other longer-term 
mechanisms and effects. 
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7Understanding the Long-term
impacts of the eU framework 
programme of research and 
technoLogicaL deveLopment1
1. IntroDuctIon
The Framework Programme matters. 
• It is the main policy instrument for supporting Research and 
Technological Development (RTD) at the level of the European 
Union 
• It is probably the largest competitive R&D programme in the 
world, funding a significant volume of research and innovation and 
accounting for more than 5% of Europe’s state expenditure on R&D
• It is emblematic of the radical changes in the way we perceive and 
perform R&D over the last three decades
• It plays a pivotal role in coordinating the direction of research and 
innovation on our continent
To understand the Framework Programme, we need an intellectual 
framework. In this lecture, therefore, I propose first to discuss the way 
our understanding of research and innovation has changed since the 
mid-Twentieth Century from an individualistic, heroic perspective (still 
highly visible in, for example, the work of the Nobel Foundation) to a 
more networked, systemic view (of which the Framework Programme 
is itself an instance). Second, I will relate this change of perspective 
to the level of overall research and innovation policy and our changing 
beliefs about the role and potential of the state in the production 
1 Substantial parts of this lecture are based on Erik Arnold, Malin Carlberg, Flora Giaracca, Andrej Horvath,
 Zsusza Jávorka, Paula Knee, Bea Mahieu, Ingeborg Meijer, Sabeen Sidiqi and James Stroyan, Long-term 
 Impacts of the Framework Programme, Brussels: EC, DG-Research (forthcoming 2011) 
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8of wealth from knowledge. Third, I will explore the history (and a 
little bit of the pre-history) of the Framework Programme. Fourth, I 
will illustrate some of the longer-term effects of the Framework 
Programme –  some of which are surprising, given that most of the 
considerable evaluation literature about the Framework Programme 
focuses on short-term effects. Finally, I speculate a little about how 
to make progress in policy, our understanding of the Framework and 
its evaluation as the nature of the Framework continues to change. 
2. PersPectIves on research anD InnovatIon 
It is a commonplace observation in innovation and research policy 
that the ‘linear model’ of innovation is dead; even if it continues to 
influence policy thinking and practice. A more current perspective 
is to see innovation and research as parts of a complex ‘national 
innovation system’, in which innovation processes can start anywhere 
(not necessarily with R&D) and where new knowledge production 
contributes to the ‘stock’ of knowledge used in innovation. Recognising 
this and the increasing importance of networks in research and 
innovation, research and innovation policy interventions have become 
increasingly complex. The Framework Programme is a leading example.
  
2.1	 Innovation	and	the	Role	of	Research
In relation to innovation, the predominant popular mental model 
– the so-called ‘linear model’ – suggests that basic science leads	
to	 applied science, which causes innovation and wealth. Almost all 
policymakers know that it is wrong – but it nonetheless has a strong 
influence on policy. Historical examples such as the development of 
thermodynamics – which was given an impetus by the development 
of the steam engine to explain why steam engines worked and 
only later provided a basis for improving their design – give a more 
useful sense of the interplay between basic research and innovation. 
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9The linear model was more or less invented in response to the startling 
achievements of physics during the Second World War. The manifesto 
for the new view of science was Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report2 
Science: The Endless Frontier, which successfully argued the case for 
a US National Science Foundation and paved the way for the massive 
expansion of higher education and research since the war. Bush argued 
that increasing science funding would automatically increase product 
and process innovation and therefore national competitiveness as 
well as military preparedness. With hindsight, we can see how easy it 
was to take the scientific achievements of the War out of context. They 
were not ‘science push’ but responded to clear military requirements 
and were therefore in a strong sense user-oriented, happening in 
command economies, where it is possible to force a direct connection 
between technological advance and economic production 
During the 1950s, the science-push model of innovation dominated3. 
But thanks to the empirical work of those such as Carter and Williams4, 
Schmookler5 and Myers and Marquis6, more emphasis came to be 
placed on the role of the marketplace in innovation. This led to 
market- or needs-pull models of the innovation process, which were 
also linear but reversed the direction of causality. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, a lot of innovation research focused on the importance 
of links between suppliers and users. By the late 1970s, Mowery and 
Rosenberg8 largely settled the argument between push and pull by 
stressing the importance of coupling between science, technology and 
2 Science The Endless Frontier, A Report to the President by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific 
 Research and Development, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, July 1945 
3 This account of successive generations of innovation model is partly based on Roy Rothwell, ‘Successful 
 Industrial Innovation: Critical Factors for the 1990s’, R&D Management,:3 , p 221-239, 1992
4 Carter, C. and Williams, B., Industry and Technical Progress, Oxford University Press, 1957
5 Schmookler, J., Invention and economic growth, Harvard University  press, 1966
6 Myers, S. and Marquis, D.G., Successful Industrial Innovation, National Science Foundation, 1969
7 Daniel Shimshoni, Aspects of Scientific Entrepreneruship, PhD Thesis, Harvard, 1966; R Rothwell, C Freeman, 
 A Horsley, VTP Jarvis, AB Robertson and J Townsend, ‘SAPPHO updated – project SAPPHO phase II’,  
 Research Policy, 3, 1974, 258-291
8 Mowery, D.C. and Rosenberg, N., ‘The Influence of Market Demand upon Innovation: A Critical Review of 
 Some Recent Empirical Studies’, Research Policy, April 1978
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the marketplace. Since then, models of the links between innovation 
and research tend to be more complex, as in Figure 1. 
The preoccupation of the earlier generations of innovation model 
is with the link between the flow of new knowledge and economic 
innovation. However, this ignores the huge importance of the stock 
of existing knowledge indicated at the bottom of Figure 1. “Firms very 
often seek to innovate by exploiting their existing knowledge assets. 
Unforeseen problems often emerge, however, and these require R&D 
for their solution. From this perspective R&D should be seen not as 
a process of discovery that initiates innovation, but as a problem-
solving activity within already-existing innovation processes.”9 The 
vast majority of the knowledge used in any innovation comes out of 
this stock, and is not created afresh in the project that gives rise to the 
Figure 1 Modern ‘Coupling’ Model of Innovation
9 Keith Smith and Jonathan West, Australia’s Innovation Challenges: The Key Policy Issues, Submission to 
 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Science and Innovation, Inquiry into Pathways to  
 Technological Innovation, April 28, 2005  
Adapted from Roy Rothwell, “Towards the Fifth-generation Innovation Process” International Marketing Review, 11 (1), 
1994, 7-31
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innovation. Important parts of the knowledge stock can be very old, 
as was shown in the TRACES and HINDSIGHT10 projects, which 
tracked the movement of knowledge elements respectively from 
mission-orientated and basic research into industrial practice across 
very long periods of time.
Working with and reworking the stock of knowledge is the dominant 
activity in innovation. Countless surveys of OECD firms show that their 
main sources of technology are internal knowledge and other firms. 
Public sector research accounts for a vanishingly small share of their 
knowledge inputs (though bigger and more successful innovators use 
more of such knowledge than smaller and less successful ones). In 
product development, considerable efforts are devoted to monitoring 
competitors’ products and to reverse engineering. A normal pattern is 
for an industry to experience a continuous sequence of innovations. In 
so far as every innovation is based on a lot of existing knowledge mixed 
in with a little new thinking, all innovation is in a sense imitation. The 
terminology of ‘innovation’ contra ‘imitation’ with its connotation of 
‘superior’ contra ‘inferior’ serves the interests of those who do research 
to create new knowledge by enabling them to claim high status. But, 
in terms of economics and development, its connotations are counter-
productive. Imitation is perhaps the central fact about innovation and 
economic development under capitalism. 
This suggests a ‘bucket’ theory of knowledge in which innovators use 
a mixture of old and new knowledge and in which new knowledge 
enters the stock and is used in research or innovation if and when 
it becomes useful. This may be immediately, later or never. In this 
perspective, the Framework Programme produces large numbers of 
‘intermediate knowledge products’ that go into this stock, in addition to 
10 llinois Institute of Technology, 1969, Technology in Retrospect and Critical Events in Science (TRACES: A 
 report to the National Science Foundation) , NSF Contract C535; Office of the Director of Defense Research 
 and Engineering, Project Hindsight - Final Report, National Technical Information Service, 1967
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clustering R&D around problems identified or recognised by significant 
stakeholder groups. 
2.2	 From	Innovation	to	‘Innovation	System’
Our increasingly complex view of the innovation process combined 
with the growing influence of evolutionary economics – which takes 
explicit account of behaviour, learning, institutions and hence path 
dependence rather than assuming that economic activity is perfectly 
rational – underlie the emergence of the ‘innovation system’ perspective 
that now dominates thinking about the social and economic role of 
research and innovation. 
Christopher Freeman introduced the term ‘innovation system’ into the 
literature in 1987, in his study11 that aimed to explain and to learn 
from the successes of Japanese research and innovation policy. 
Freeman’s definition at that point was rather narrow: he referred to 
the state institutions involved in defining and performing research and 
innovation policy. Gradually, it was realised that performance across 
many interconnected parts of the economy12, including what the 
OECD increasingly referred to as ‘framework conditions’ (in practice 
a rag-bag of non-economic contextual factors such as tax regimes, 
regulations, laws, culture and behaviours), determined success or failure 
in innovation. Figure 1 summarises this wider scope. Correspondingly, 
the balance among different system components and the policies that 
relate to them needs to be appropriate and the policies need to be 
mutually consistent.
11 Christopher Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, London: 
 Frances Pinter, 1987 
12 RR Nelson, National Innovation Systems, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993; Bengt-Åke Lundvall, 
 National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London: Pinter, 1992
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There is some evidence in the literature to support our qualitative 
impression that the importance of systems interrelations is increasing, 
as Gibbons et al suggested when they argued that the main growth 
in knowledge production is taking place in ‘Mode 2’, by which they 
mean problem-orientated, multi-disciplinary work involving research 
performers across the economy, in companies as well as research 
institutes and universities. Econometric estimates of the economic 
importance of science are tending to rise. Patents are increasingly citing 
13 Henry Chesborough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology, 
 Harvard Business School Press, 2003 
Figure 2 A National Innovation System Heuristic  
Source: Erik Arnold and Stefan Kuhlman, RCN in the Norwegian Research and Innovation System, Background Report 
No 12 in the Evaluation of the Research Council of Norway, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry for Education, Research and 
Church Affairs, 2001 
6057 Oratieboekje Arnold v2.indd   13 18-10-11   10:51
14
scientific literature. Information and Communications Technologies 
are enabling increasingly networked ways both to do research and to 
conduct business. Globalisation of industry, (industrial R&D as well as 
science) changes the context. Industrial R&D behaviour seems to be 
changing, both fully within the private sector13 and in the context of 
state programmes such as the EU Framework Programme towards 
a much more ‘open’ model, where firms increasingly rely on the 
state and each other for key knowledge inputs, especially from more 
fundamental research. 
3. the changIng role of the emergIng euroPean state In r&D
In principle, states play a role in research and innovation policy in 
order to combat market and systems failures. These interventions 
should increase the volume and quality of research and the rate of 
innovation generating knowledge and economic spillovers for the 
benefit of society. The Framework Programme has been an important 
instrument of EU policy through which the nascent European state 
has begun to modify and assume some of the developmental roles 
formerly tackled at the Member State level, ultimately with the aim of 
creating an innovation system optimised at the European rather than 
the national level. This has involved successive extensions to the role 
of the Framework Programme. 
3.1	 Why	the	state	has	a	role	
The idea that ‘market failure’ leads to under-investment in research14 
has been the principal rationale for state funding of R&D since the early 
1960s. 
 
14 Ken Arrow , ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,’ in Richard Nelson (Ed.)  
 The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962; see also Richard Nelson, ‘
 The simple economics of basic scientific research,’ Journal of Political Economy, 1959, vol 67, pp 297-306
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Successful innovators (and, since we increasingly conceive science as a 
collective and not an individual enterprise, also successful researchers) 
are not successful solely because of their personal qualities and actions 
but also as a result of their interplay with the research and innovation 
systems they inhabit, and the quality of those systems. 
An important aspect of the innovation systems heuristic (taken 
over from evolutionary economics) is the idea that firms and other 
actors have ‘bounded rationality’ and this – together with the idea of 
interdependence – makes knowledge, learning and institutions key to 
overall performance. Learning means there is ‘path dependence’: what 
you can do tomorrow depends upon what knowledge and resources 
you have today and what you can do to adapt these. Interventions 
to improve knowledge and capabilities, set directions or coordinate 
activities can change the trajectory of the innovation system and 
therefore its performance. Correspondingly, innovation and R&D 
funding is increasingly concerned to improve participants’ capabilities, 
promoting learning or ‘behavioural additionality’ and not only to ‘help 
firms’ or ‘fund science.’ The Framework Programme demonstrates the 
importance of a coordinating function for breaking out of such lock-ins. 
Cumulated capabilities and experience can ‘lock in’ parts of the system 
to configurations that perform badly. Systems that have evolved 
to perform well at regional or national level will not automatically 
reconfigure to perform better at higher levels. ‘Unlearning’ as well as 
learning may be needed. This may involve the state in playing a role 
as a change agent (this is in some cases an explicit task of innovation 
agencies). Systemic failures can arise in capabilities, institutions, 
networks or framework conditions. Because systems failures and 
performance are highly dependent upon the interplay of characteristics 
in individual systems, there can be no simple rule-based policy as is 
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possible in relation to the static idea of market failure.15 Rather, a key 
role for state policy making is ‘bottleneck analysis’ – continuously 
identifying and rectifying structural imperfections and inadequate 
behaviours.16 Such interventions may be increasingly complex 
– rather than ‘treating’ just individual organisations there is a need to 
bring together multiple interventions to address the capabilities and 
interactions among networks and their members. 
3.2	 The	changing	role	of	the	European	state	in	practice
The Framework Programme has developed and grown in parallel with 
major changes in the ambitions of industry and innovation policy 
in Europe and in the rules governing competition and the relation 
between the state and its industrial suppliers. The technological 
optimism of the 1960s triggered large investments in building 
national technological champions in areas such as transport, energy 
and computing. Like defence companies, these tended to function 
in “development pairs”17 with national agencies or state-owned 
companies, such as airlines, railways, telephone companies and 
power generators. With the national state as a guaranteed launch 
customer – and in some cases, also, co-developer – many of these 
companies were able to produce significant innovations and to 
build strong international as well as national market positions. 
Successive liberalisations at national and European levels and 
changes in WTO rules meant that it became more and more difficult 
to operate such development pairs. Liberalisation has meant in many 
fields a reduced role for the state in developing new generations of 
technology. Breaking the development pairs also meant breaking 
15 Johan Hauknes and Lennart Norgren, Economic Rationales of Government Intervention in Innovation and the 
 Supply of Innovation-Related services, STEP Report 08 1999, Oslo: STEP Group, downloadable from 
 www.nifu.no
16 Erik Arnold, Stefan Kuhlmann and Barend van der Meulen, A Singular Council: Evaluation of the Research 
 Council of Norway, Oslo: Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs, 2001
17 Erik Dahmén, “Entrepreneurial activity and the development of Swedish industry, 1919-1939” American 
 Economic Association Translation Series, New York: RD Irwin, 1970
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the link to the national level, reduced opportunities to use national 
idiosyncrasies to protect national suppliers and a reduced role for 
national standards. Standardisation power moved up from the 
national level through the European level and towards the global level. 
With globalisation of markets came restructuring of industry. In the 
case of telecommunications, the Framework Programme was one of 
the policy ingredients supporting this transition. ESPRIT in FP1 and 
more especially RACE (later Telematics) in FP2 aimed to set common 
technology and communications standards and the concentration and 
development of European telecommunications equipment suppliers 
in the era of liberalisation. The FP activities were, however, only part 
of the Commission’s policy effort in telecommunications, which also 
involved setting the liberalisation agenda for Europe and playing one 
of a number of contributory roles to the definition and implementation 
of the GSM mobile telecommunications standard at European level18. 
(Contributions to subsequent standards were mostly through pre-
normalisation and standards-orientated projects within the Framework 
itself.) This is an example of connecting research and innovation 
activities within the Framework Programme to wider set of policies 
that is too infrequently seen 
1960s-style ‘technology push’ efforts focused on national champions 
eventually fell into disrepute, in part because they became more or 
less illegal, in part because their ambitions widened from contexts 
where the state was the major first customer and had considerable 
monopsonistic power to situations –  most notably in computing 
– where the state had little influence over demand. A lot of the effort 
in ESPRIT (especially in FP1) went to prop up ‘national champions’ 
like ICL, BULL and Siemens’ mainframe computer division at a point 
18 Herbert Ungerer and Nicholas P Costello, Télécommunications en Europe, Luxembourg: Office des Publications
 Officielles des Communautés Européennes, 1988
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where IBM had almost total dominance of the world mainframe 
markets – and when the new generation of minicomputer technology 
was already waiting in the wings, eventually to undermine much of 
the mainframe market. ESPRIT II and especially III marked a move 
away from “the failure of an industry policy then aiming to sustain IT 
manufacturing in Europe”19 and towards a more all-encompassing and 
more software- and applications-based idea of ‘information society’. 
‘Rust belt’ national industry policies to prop up declining industries 
such as ship building in different ways tried to work against the logic 
of markets and were equally unsuccessful. 
While many academics like to describe the FP as a ‘top down’ instrument, 
in fact it evolved rapidly away from the ‘national champions’ style into 
something much more responsive to the needs of stakeholder groups. 
By accident or design, it learnt the lesson that backing a particular 
company (or for that matter research group) is an unnecessary act of 
hubris. Coordinating and promoting competition within areas, which 
stakeholders identify as having thematic priority, is a more powerful 
approach because it harnesses rather than resists market forces. 
3.3	 EU	Research	and	Innovation	Policy	
We can think of three distinct periods in European research and 
innovation policy: before 2000, when the Commission aimed mainly 
to network and stimulate activities at the Member State level; 
2000-2010, when building the European Research Area (ERA) and 
enhancing competitiveness via the Lisbon Agenda and the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) came onto the agenda; and the 
period from the present, when the Commission is moving towards 
stronger coordination of research and innovation policy across the 
Member States but increasingly decentralising this coordination. 
19 Umberto Columbo et al, Esprit Review Board 1996 Report: Making Progress Happen through Development, 
 Application and Diffusion of Information Technologies, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the  
 European Communities, 1994 
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European science and technology policies in the 1960s and 1970s were 
heavily influenced by the idea of a ‘technology gap’ with the USA. 
Servan-Schreiber’s book The American Challenge20 was emblematic 
of this concern, which – together with a strong spirit of technological 
optimism in the 1960s – triggered the creation of a range of institutions 
and grands projets in Europe.21
In 1965, the fledgling European Community of six countries set up 
a sub-committee of its medium-term economic policy committee 
to deal with science and technology. It took until 1971 to sign a 
cluster of seven international agreements to cooperate in various 
technology areas and define the European Cooperation in Science 
and Technology (COST), which was originally seen as a European-
level funder. However, the ineffectiveness of working through treaties 
led to the Council resolution of 14 January 1974 establishing a 
Community policy for R&D and internalised the funding function in 
the Commission. In the following years, the Commission ran a small 
number of R&D programmes, primarily in energy and data processing. 
The FP was launched after a period in which European multilateral 
R&D cooperation had blossomed, for example through CERN, 
EMBL and ESF. In the period since FP1 began, in 1984, there have 
been no significant new European R&D cooperations in which the 
Commission is not central except Eureka in 1985, which was in 
effect Paris’ reply to what it saw as a shift of power towards Brussels. 
20 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Le Défi Américain, Paris: Denoel, 1967
21 For example the Ministry of Technology in the UK, the first innovation agency in Sweden (the Swedish National 
 Board for technological Development – STU, the Anglo-French supersonic transport project Concorde as well  
 as new institutions to study science and technology policy such as the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex  
 University
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The first Framework Programmes - industry-oriented and very much 
‘technology-push’ - as well as the Single European Act (ratified in 1987) 
and the Maastricht Treaty (ratified in 1993) need to be understood in 
the context of the Commission and European governments’ desire 
to bridge the ‘technology gap’. On the one hand, Europe’s science 
and technology capabilities were to be strengthened through 
the promotion and funding of collaboration; on the other hand, 
competitiveness was to be enhanced by forcing Europe’s ‘national 
champions’ to confront more competition in a single European 
Market.22 Over time, the Framework Programmes’ scope has grown 
to cover a very wide range of themes and the repertoire of instruments 
has increased from the early focus on collaborative research to areas 
like human mobility. Up to and including FP4 (1994-8), European 
Added Value in the form of networking, cohesion, scale benefits and 
Figure 3 Timing and Budgets of Framework Programmes and their Evaluations
* 5-year basis; the actual budget for the 7 years of FP7 is €50.5 bn
22 John Peterson, Margaret Sharp, Technology Policy in the European Union, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998
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so on was largely seen as sufficient justification for the FPs. In FP5 
(1998-2002), the focus shifted towards socio-economic benefits. 
The Maastricht Treaty (1993) gave the Commission the role of leading 
the coordination of national RTD policies and extended the scope of 
the FPs – starting with Fourth Framework Programme (1994- 1998), 
which now included basic research.
A major change in policy thinking was introduced by the Commission’s 
White Paper “Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The Challenges 
and Ways Forward into the 21st Century” (1993)23 followed up by the 
“Green Paper on Innovation” (1995)24, which identified the so-called 
“European paradox”, i.e. Europe’s “comparatively limited capacity to 
convert scientific breakthroughs and technological achievements into 
industrial and commercial successes.” 
The focus of the debate in the 1980s on how Europe could become 
competitive in new technologies now shifted to debates concerned 
with using new technologies.25 This shift in thinking was reflected in 
the more societal orientation of the Fifth Framework Programme (1994 
– 1998). Thus, at the end of the 1990s, European R&D policy became 
part of a more comprehensive innovation policy. From now on, higher-
level European policies such as the Lisbon strategy and the European 
Research Area constituted the overall context for the Framework 
Programmes. 
The 2000 Communication on the ERA26 argued that Europe lagged 
the USA and Japan in industrial competitiveness and the ability 
23 Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century - White Paper 
 Parts A and B. COM (93) 700 final/A and B, 5 December 1993. Bulletin of the European Communities,  
 Supplement 6/93 
24 “Green paper on Innovation”, European Commission, COM (95) 688 final
25 John Peterson, Margaret Sharp, Technology Policy in the European Union, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998
26 COM 2000 (6) Final
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to make social and economic use of research. Complaining that 
there was no European policy on research, it proposed a unified 
research area, comparable with the idea of the EU as a common 
market for goods and services. “De-compartmentalisation and 
better integration of Europe’s scientific and technological area is an 
indispensable condition for invigorating research in Europe.” Research 
and innovation actions building on the idea of the ERA were to be 
pursued but broader policies were also evolved that included improved 
policies for the Information Society, modernising the ‘European 
social model’ and macroeconomic policies. Not long afterwards, the 
Council set the Barcelona target of spending 3% of EU GDP on R&D. 
The Sixth Framework Programme (2002-6) aimed to implement aspects 
of the Lisbon agenda –  in particular through the use of larger-scale 
instruments to ‘structure’ the research communities and to ‘optimise’ 
their performance at the European rather than the national level. 
The idea of ERA has been evolving since it was introduced in 2000. In 
2007, the Green Paper that ‘re-launched’ the ERA27 described its key 
features as 
• An adequate flow of competent researchers with high levels of 
mobility between institutions, disciplines, sectors and countries 
• World-class research infrastructures, integrated, networked and 
accessible to research teams from across Europe and the world, 
notably thanks to new generations of electronic communication 
infrastructures
• Excellent research institutions engaged in effective public-private 
cooperation and partnerships, forming the core of research and 
innovation ‘clusters’ including ‘virtual research communities’, 
27 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper, European Research Area: New Perspectives, 
 COM(2007) 161 final, Brussels 4.4.2007
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mostly specialised in interdisciplinary areas and attracting a critical 
mass of human and financial resources 
• Effective knowledge-sharing notably between public research and 
industry, as well as with the public at large 
• Well-coordinated research programmes and priorities, including 
a significant volume of jointly-programmed public research 
investment at European level involving common priorities, 
coordinated implementation and joint evaluation
• A wide opening of the European Research Area to the world 
with special emphasis on neighbouring countries and a strong 
commitment to addressing global challenges with Europe’s partners 
DG-ENTR brought its innovation programmes together in the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), with a 
budget of just over €3.6bn for 2007-2013 (equivalent to about 7% of 
the €51bn budget of FP7 for the same period). It continues activities 
to promote entrepreneurship, adding the ICT-PSP programme (aiming 
to demonstrate and create market conditions for the take-up of ICT-
based innovations) and the Intelligent Energy Programme. It has 
been supplemented with six Lead Market Initiatives, where demand-
side stakeholders as well as various EU R&D groupings (such as the 
ETPs) have been consulted about how to create demand conditions 
that will encourage innovation in areas where Europe has the 
potential to supply the innovations. These conditions include public 
procurement. Both ICT-PSP and the Lead Markets Initiative aim to 
provide links to the Framework Programme. The linkage is not strong 
but these nonetheless do represent some steps towards the kind of 
‘holistic’ research and innovation policy sought at home by increasing 
numbers of Member State governments. “Horizon 2020’, which is 
to replace both Framework Programmes’ should in principle provide 
better integration of innovation and RTD policy at European level. 
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3.4	 European	Added	Value	(EAV)	
From the start, the EU and its predecessor Communities have been 
expected to justify their actions with reference to the additional value 
created compared with action at Member State level. This principle 
of ‘subsidiarity’ was clarified in the Maastricht Treaty, which also 
required that EU interventions should be ‘proportional’: namely, they 
should not go beyond what is needed to reach the goals of the Treaty. 
From FP1 onwards, the Commission applied the principles that have 
since become known as the Reisenhuber criteria in order to justify 
Community support for R&D. These were to reserve FP money for
• Research activities of such a scale that single Member Countries 
either could not provide the necessary financial means and 
personnel, or could do so only with difficulty
• Research that would obviously benefit from being carried out 
jointly, after taking account of the additional costs inherent in all 
actions involving international cooperation
• Research that, owing to the complementary nature of work carried 
out at the national level in a given sector, would achieve significant 
results in the whole of the Community for problems to which 
solutions call for research conducted on a vast scale, particularly in 
a geographic sense
• Research that contributes to the cohesion of the common market 
and which promotes the unification of European science and 
technology as well as research that leads where necessary to the 
establishment of uniform laws and standards28
An additional criterion covering the development of scientific and 
technical potential in Europe via different routes was added for FP4: 
1994-1998. This justified research actions which contribute to the 
28 United Kingdom Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Research and the European Union, POST 
 Report Summary,  No 83, 1996 
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mobilisation or improvement of European scientific and technical 
potential and actions which improve co-ordination between national 
RTD programmes, and between Community programmes and work in 
other international fora (S&T potential).29
While formally the criteria for EAV used in FP6 were essentially the same 
as those in FP530, the scope of the activities changed. New instruments 
were included in FP6 that were intended to influence the structure of 
the European research community, widely defined to include industry. 
A little-noticed novelty of FP5 was the ‘mainstreaming’ of participation 
in the FP by ‘Third Countries’, ie those that are neither Member 
nor Associated States. This partly involved bringing in a range of 
development projects aimed at poor countries and regions outside 
Europe but – especially in FP6 – it also involved growing participation in 
mainstream FP projects, not least by Russia and China31. FP7 involves 
a greater degree of what the Commission terms ‘internationalisation’ 
(as if the EU were a nation –  we should more properly speak of 
‘globalisation’). As yet, there is little clear strategy for globalisation 
and the issue appears to receive little priority in EU policymaking. 
In parallel with the development of FP6, the Commission expanded the 
definition of EAV in another new direction, which was incorporated in 
the Communication “Europe and Basic Research”32 in 2004 but did not 
really become operative until the creation of the European Research 
Council under FP7.  
29 Yellow Window, Technofi, Wiseguys, Identifying the constituent elements of the European Added Value (EAV) 
 of the EU RTD Programmes: conceptual analysis based on practical experience, Antwerp, 2000
30 Communication from the Commission, Making a reality of the European Research Area: Guidelines for EU  
 research activities (2002-2006), Brussels 4.10.2000, COM(2000) 612  
31 Erik Arnold, Sylvia Schwaag-Serger, Neil Brown and Sophie Bussillet, Evaluation of Chinese Participation in the  
 EU Framework Programme, Brighton: Technopolis, 2008 
32 COM (2004) 9, final, 14.1.2004
6057 Oratieboekje Arnold v2.indd   25 18-10-11   10:51
26
33 Achilleos Mitsos, Speech at the ELSF-Euroscience Conference of the European Research Centre, Dublin,  
 21-22 October 2003; quoted from Daniel Tarschys, The Enigma of European Added Value: Setting Priorities for  
 the European Union, SIEPS 2005:4, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2005
Until now we have defined European Added Value as 
the collaboration of teams. Now it is time to bring a new 
definition to European Added Value, one that incorporates 
the principle of allowing a researcher in any of our member 
states to compete with all other researchers to win funding. 
Competition therefore becomes an essential new, forward-
looking definition of European Added Value.33
Dimensions of European Added Value FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6 FP7
Scale too big for Member States (MS)  
to handle alone X X X X X X X
Financial benefits: a joint approach  
would be advantageous X X X X X X X
Combines complementary MS efforts to tackle  
European problems X X X X X X X
Cohesion X X X X X X X
Unification of European S&T across borders X X X X X X X
Promotes uniform laws and standards X X X X X X X
Mobilising EU potential at European and global level  
by coordinating national and EU programmes    X X X X
Contributes to implementing EU policy     X X X
Contributes to societal objectives  
(later ‘grand challenges’)     X X X
Exploits opportunities for the development of  
European science, technology and industry     X X X
Structures the EU R&D community and ‘fabric’       X X
Improves quality through exposure to EU-wide  
competition        X
Figure 4 The Evolving Character of ‘European Added Value’
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4. effects of the framework Programme 
While formally a single programme, the Framework is in fact a 
composite of many sub-programmes addressing different themes 
and their associated goals. It is nonetheless possible to generate a 
high-level description of its intervention logic and identify common 
long-term goals. Existing evaluation evidence tells us that the 
Framework Programme funds high-quality, pre-competitive R&D, 
mostly producing ‘intermediate knowledge products’ that can later be 
used in R&D and various kinds of networks as well as to increased 
competitivity. To a considerable extent, its design reflects the needs 
and interests of important stakeholders and R&D communities in 
Europe. Its longer-term effects go beyond these, crucially including 
setting agendas, creating road maps and coordinating the efforts of 
research communities. This can lead to the emergence of new fields 
and technological trajectories, restructuring of the European research 
effort, improvements in policymaking and increased competitiveness. 
The paper details the impact mechanisms through which this is achieved. 
4.1	 Expected	Effects	of	the	Framework	Programme
As Brian Loasby has rather wryly pointed out, “Nobody knows how 
a Boeing 737 works.”34 The same can be said for the Framework 
Programme. Many people are knowledgeable about individual sub-
components; some understand the architecture at various points in 
time; but no one can offer a complete understanding. In fact, the FP 
may be harder to understand than the aeroplane because while the 737 
is designed top-down and optimised towards a particular purpose, the 
FP is in no small part self organising and its purposes evolve over time. 
34 Brian J Loasby, “Making connections,” Symposium on Information and Knowledge in Economic, Econ Journal 
 Watch, 2 (1), 2005, 56-65
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Figure 5 attempts nonetheless to summarise the overall intervention 
logic of the Framework Programme –  viewed through today’s 
spectacles. It includes both the impacts that result from or relate to the 
programmes as a whole and other impacts that are specific to one or 
other of the themes and instruments. In the next sections, we explore 
the extent to which these expected impacts are in fact visible over the 
longer term. 
4.2	 What	the	existing	evaluation	record	tells	us
In line with the thinking of the New Public Management movement and 
reforms at the Commission, evaluation of the Framework Programme 
has increasingly been tied to the programming cycle and regarded as a 
part of the management process. This means in practice that we have 
repeatedly been trying to evaluate projects and programmes at mid 
term and (less often) immediately after completion. We have a series of 
repeated snapshots of what participants are trying to achieve and what 
those deeply involved with the projects expect the short-medium term 
effects will be. This evaluation record tells us a lot of interesting things 
about the Framework Programme – but not what its longer-term effects 
are. Since the overall objectives of the Framework have to do with 
industrial and societal impacts, this is a problem – and it is precisely 
why we have been trying to study some of these longer terms effects. 
We can nonetheless see a lot from the short-term evaluation evidence35. 
• The FP funds high-quality R&D: the appraisal processes are tough; 
the competition is fierce; participating researchers include the 
scientific elite and their outputs tend to be of higher performance 
than those of non-participants (measured in bibliometric terms, 
especially through citations)
35 Erik Arnold, John Clark and Alessandro Muscio, ‘What the evaluation record tells us about Framework  
 Programme performance’, Science and Public Policy, Vol 32, No 5, 2005, pp385-397; Erik Arnold, 
 Framework Programme 6: Meta-Evaluation, Brussels: European Commission, DG Research, 2009
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• Growth in high-quality international co-publication within Europe 
has accompanied the growth of the FP
• Just as the FP attracts the more excellent researchers in their fields, 
so it engages the more research-intensive companies within their 
respective branches
• It is – by design – a pre-competitive, collaborative programme, so 
it primarily produces ‘intermediate knowledge outputs’ as well as 
technical and market network relationships that are re-used in other 
R&D and business processes. Participants who enter projects with 
a deliberate product or process innovation objective are more likely 
to obtain short-term results than others
• With few exceptions, the FP is a place to exploit existing strength. 
Especially in established areas, it is too competitive to allow capacity 
building – that has to be done with national resources
• Most participants have only a fleeting relationship with the FP – one 
or two projects and then they move on. However, new participants 
appear to learn the value of networked R&D and increasingly to 
participate in ‘open innovation’ activities, even if they do not stay 
much involved with the FP 
• There is a strong core of established players and networks whose 
composition slowly shifts over time. Just as with global ‘invisible 
colleges’, you have to ‘earn your spurs’ in order to join these 
networks and to carry on delivering value to your partners if you 
want to survive. However, we know very little of the details of how 
networks work, how networking relates to strategy or how network 
shape relates to success36
• Despite the trend to larger instruments in recent Framework 
Programmes, bigger networks do not seem to be more productive than 
smaller ones – in fact, what evidence there is suggests the opposite
36 Except in so far as believing that central positions with connections to many other members are powerful and  
 that positions that make you a ‘bridge’ between two or more networks give superior access to information 
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• The FP is often associated with pre-normalisation R&D and the 
development of technical standards
• Most participants believe that FP participation increases their 
competitivity. The indirect nature of the FP’s effects (through 
‘intermediate knowledge outputs’) makes them very hard to track. 
Parts of the FP that focus on smaller firms and more direct results 
have been evaluated using a cash benefit-cost approach, which 
suggests high benefit-cost ratios. Smaller firms benefit less than 
larger ones (and are generally less satisfied with FP participation) 
4.3	 Some	lessons	from	looking	at	the	long	term
The corollary of the short-term focus of Framework Programme 
evaluation is that very little research has been done on its longer-
term effects. A study in 2008 looked at long-term effects of FP4-6 in 
 
Sweden37 while a second in 2011 looks at effects at the level of the 
EU38. Both are essentially exploratory and provide sets of case studies. 
4.3.1 Evidence from Sweden
Swedish companies spearheaded national participation in the FPs in 
the 1980s, but the universities entered in strength from FP3 and by FP6 
accounted for 60% of the FP funding flowing to Sweden. Volvo; Ericsson; 
Saab; Vattenfall; and Telia/Teliasonera have dominated the industrial 
participation. Few other companies have a large or persistent presence. 
Therefore, vehicles (including aerospace), telecommunications and 
energy are strongly represented while major Swedish sectors like pulp 
and paper, pharmaceuticals and chemicals are not conspicuous. Much 
of the major industrial participation is in areas where there have in the 
37 Erik Arnold, Tomas Åström, Patries Boekholt, Neil Brown, Barbara Good, Rurik Holmberg, Ingeborg Meijer and  
 Geert van der Veen, Impacts of the Framework Programme in Sweden, VA 2008:11, Stockholm: VINNOVA, 
 2008 
38 Erik Arnold, Malin Carlberg, Flora Giaracca, Andrej Horvath, Zsusza Jávorka, Paula Knee, Bea Mahieu,  
 Ingeborg Meijer, Sabeen Sidiqi and James Stroyan, Long-term Impacts of the Framework Programme, 
 Brussels: EC, DG-Research (forthcoming 2011)
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past been ‘development pairs’ between industry and the state. The 
Swedish industrial research institutes are small and poorly funded 
by international standards, so their participation has been limited. 
In the university context, the FPs have added quite a substantial 
amount of money to external research income. In so far as research 
(and education) are good things, then these are good things that should 
broadly lead to increased social and economic welfare. And Sweden’s 
excellent performance in bringing money home from the FPs means 
the bargain for Sweden has been a good one: she takes out more than 
she puts in and most of that additional money goes to the universities. 
The additional money complements national resources. It allows more 
applied and innovation-orientated work to be done by companies 
as well as academics. It allows some themes that are overlooked 
or otherwise difficult to fund at the national level nonetheless to be 
funded. Perhaps the most interesting thing is that by adding diversity 
to a system that some of our interviewees saw as overly focused on 
basic research the FP funding adds robustness to the Swedish system 
as a whole. 
The FPs have had more influence at the level of individual research 
groups than they have had on overall university strategies. They 
clearly added size and scope to researchers’ networks, probably 
increasing quality and including them in more international ‘invisible 
colleges’ that make them ‘insiders’ in groups of researchers working 
at or near the leading edge in their fields. The practice of staffing FP 
projects largely with doctorands ensures that they play an important 
role in doctoral education and also exposes those doctorands to the 
international partnerships of the FPs, with beneficial effects on their 
educational, research and career prospects. Swedish universities 
essentially obtain these benefits because they can apply bottom-up for 
project funding, largely unconstrained by any strategic considerations 
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of the FPs, national programmes or their own universities. But 
the fact that the universities largely lack thematic strategies for 
their own operations and consistently lack strategies for handling 
the FPs is an important missed opportunity to use FP resources 
systematically to promote the development of critical masses. 
Our study looked at four industries where we expected to see longer-
term impacts of the Framework Programme: pharmaceuticals; ICT; 
vehicles; and sustainable energy. 
Major pharmaceuticals companies tend to do little in the FPs, so the 
effects of the Framework reach these companies by strengthening 
their university partners. The FPs have added considerable resources 
to the Swedish university research effort in life sciences and health. 
These are areas of pre-existing strength in which Swedish research 
is highly competitive and Swedish institutions have seized the 
opportunities provided to widen their thematic research areas in 
areas prioritised by the FPs. The lack of an explicit Swedish strategy 
for life sciences and health research means that use of the FPs has 
to be opportunistic. Sweden has little influence over the FP agenda 
because it is not clear or agreed how Sweden would like that 
agenda to change. The limited presence of major Swedish industry 
in the emerging Innovative Medicines Initiative JTI in the area will 
ensure that Swedish strategic influence continues to be small. 
Swedish ICT participation is dominated by universities and research 
institutes and has – together with national programmes – supported the 
need to increase the research and education areas in ICT significantly 
over the past 20 years or so. FP funding has broadened the research 
base by supporting some areas of research that were hard to fund from 
national resources.  Numbers of large and small firms have obtained 
short-term support from the FPs. Ericsson and Teliasonera are the 
major companies that have worked with the FPs at some scale and 
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over a long period. Teliasonera’s importance as a source of technology 
and market power has been declining since liberalisation. However, 
Ericsson’s participations in the FP have enabled it to build strong 
positions in 3G mobile technologies through influencing standards 
and key choices of technological direction. Innovations derived from 
participation in FP3 are still being implemented and others from 
later work are in the pipeline. In this area where Sweden had already 
established significant industrial strength, the FPs have been a powerful 
lever on national industrial and technological competitiveness. 
In contrast with the other industries studied, vehicles participations are 
more industry- than university-dominated and the work of the projects 
is generally more applied. Important aspects of the continuing strength 
of Swedish positions in the industry build on long-term alliances with 
Swedish universities in areas like combustion, catalysis and safety. 
These alliances have been brought into FP participation, extending 
the scale of national efforts but also building new links to foreign 
institutions. This industry is very explicit in internally agreeing and then 
telling the Commission what should be put into the FP strategy via 
organisations such as EUCAR. As a result, the FPs address longer-term 
issues of relevance to industry. The complementary combination of 
national and FP programmes has been instrumental in the survival of 
the Swedish road vehicles industry in its current form and is – from a 
Swedish perspective – a major success. 
In sustainable energy, the FPs have served to increase the amount of 
university research in a pattern that reproduces the pattern of national 
effort. The additional spending is not sufficient to overcome the 
fragmentation of research within the higher education sector, which 
essentially uses FP money to do ‘more of the same’ – although with 
the added benefits that arise from international networking. The major 
energy equipment suppliers have tackled the limited modifications to 
traditional equipment needed for thermal biofuels but are not involved 
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in the major new potential sustainables. With neither the incumbent 
companies nor the state stepping up to shoulder the innovation risks, 
that burden falls to a number of small companies – several of them 
supported bottom-up through the Framework Programme. However, 
Swedish policy seems to be unable to move beyond conventional R&D 
policy to develop the kind of consistent industry, energy and taxation 
policies, developmental procurement or demonstration measures 
likely to be needed to accelerate the shift to sustainables – let along to 
seize the opportunity to establish industrial advantage in sustainable 
technologies.  In the past, major leaps in energy technology have involved 
the state as a major customer and risk-taker with new technology 
and it is not clear that the needed rapid transition to new energy 
sources can be obtained without a similar type of intervention that 
goes well beyond the current mandate of the Framework Programmes. 
The study suggests that the FPs have had some important impacts in 
Sweden and that some of the areas of limited impact result from a lack 
of strategic direction from the Swedish side. Where the FPs have had 
limited strategic impact, this is because there are not many strategies 
to impact. This is a vicious circle: in the absence of national strategy, 
it is difficult to articulate how the FPs’ strategies should change in 
order to serve the national interest. Partly as a result of this, the FPs’ 
ambition to ‘structure’ research in Sweden has not been realised at 
all. The FP resources have added a little scale but not changed the 
structure of the higher education and research sector – and certainly 
not helped address the long-standing problem of fragmentation in the 
research community. In principle the FP resources could be used to 
support restructuring, but only in the presence of national strategies. 
Where there are strong industrial lobbies or groupings, the FP has 
helped generate agreement about technical directions and influenced 
standards
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Perhaps the most striking thing about this analysis is that it points to 
circularities. Where there is a national strategy or an industry strategy, 
the FPs can be recruited to this cause. The openness of the FPs to 
strategic ideas means that where there are powerful lobby groups, their 
ideas are likely to be adopted. The FP is much less good at dealing with 
unpredictable or SME-dominated sectors. It cannot tackle areas like 
sustainable energy very well, where it is not clear who its discussion 
counterpart is and where it seems necessary to go beyond the existing 
rules and functions of the FP in order to effect the industrial change 
that is urgently required. 
4.3.2 Evidence from the EU level
At the EU level, we experimented with co-word analysis of project titles 
and abstracts as a way to thematically to cluster activities and citation 
analysis to look for the kinds of flurries of citation that tend to happen 
around breakthrough research. While these techniques have clear 
promise in analysing science, the different communication style of 
Framework projects compared with scientific articles and the inadequacy 
of available databases for identifying all the researcher participants in 
projects meant that our results were inconclusive. We believe these 
methods have promise but still need further experimentation. The case 
study component of the research therefore offers the most interesting 
account. Our six cases were chosen partly on the basis of the co-word 
cluster analysis and party through discussion with officials who had 
been active in relevant parts of the European Commission during FP3-
6. Our aim was not to be representative but to explore a range of impact 
mechanisms so as to provide a ‘map’ for future research. We looked at 
• Quantum Information processing and Computing (QIPC)
• Brain research 
• Stratospheric Ozone (O3) research
• Solar Photovoltaics (PV)
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• Automotive industry
• The Manufuture European Technology Platform
The current technology trajectory for ICT, based on semi-conductors, 
has provided steady performance improvement through increasing 
miniaturisation during the last 60 years. However, it will reach its limits 
by around 202039. Already today, quantum effects begin to affect 
performance. The need for technological alternatives has driven research 
in a number of fields, including Quantum Information Processing and 
Communications - QIPC. By harnessing quantum phenomena such 
as superposition, entanglement and coherence to encode, process 
and transfer information, QIPC will radically increase the speed of 
calculations and provide communications that are inherently secure. In 
QIPC, the Framework Programme picked up the emergence of a new 
field of science and technology more rapidly than the member states, 
helped it establish scientific and technological agendas, organise and 
grow in Europe to such an extent that the EU appears fully competitive 
with the other world R&D leaders. Beginning in the bottom-up part of 
the Future Emerging Technologies sub-programme, the Commission 
quickly understood the importance of QIPC. It launched a ‘proactive’ 
FET project that reflected the views of over 100 scientists on the way 
the field should develop. This was followed by greatly increased R&D 
project funding –  but also, crucially, by a series of networking and 
coordination initiatives that kept the R&D agenda constantly under 
review by the scientific and industrial communities. The field has not 
yet reached the stage where products and processes are developed, 
but Europe has the technological basis and started to develop 
standards for doing so and therefore for continuing to maintain strong 
positions in the global computing and communications industries as 
they go through a paradigm shift in how they process information. 
39 Source: http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/index.htm
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The Framework Programme has been less decisive in Brain Research, 
which was already well established at the point where FP funding 
began. Diseases of the brain and central nervous system cause 
increasing human suffering and economic cost as Europe’s population 
ages. In this area, and in pharmaceuticals more generally, Europe 
is losing ground to the USA both in terms of public investment in 
research and in overall share of the drugs market. The Framework 
Programme has nonetheless made important contributions in imaging 
and helped support and integrate the European research community 
in a period when the USA has been investing much more public 
money in the field than the European Member States have, in sum. 
Launching the European Brain Council was an important contribution 
to setting and maintaining a relevant and up to date research agenda 
in Europe. The FP has been important in keeping Europe ‘in the game’ 
in this field. With the launch of the first Joint Programming initiative 
on Altzheimer’s disease, the Framework has decisively increased its 
agenda-setting role, leveraging large amounts of money and effort at 
the Member State level. 
Damage to the Ozone layer in the atmosphere, which protects us 
from excessive ultraviolet light and from some of the heating effect 
of solar radiation on the atmosphere poses a major risk to life. When 
the Montreal Protocol (the first international treaty aiming to mitigate 
damage to the Ozone layer) was signed in 1987, European research 
on stratospheric Ozone lay far behind that in the USA. The Framework 
Programme has made a major contribution by growing and helping 
coordinate the European research community, not least through 
organising multinational research fieldwork campaigns to provide a 
better evidence base for policy. The European Advisory Science Panel 
on Stratospheric Ozone advised the Commission of needed research 
up till the period of FP6 and the coordinating unit that supported the 
Panel organised repeated reviews of the state of European science 
that shaped the trajectory of research. The Framework Programme 
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has helped the European research community move from lagging 
far behind the USA to working at the global frontier. Research 
results have shaped the evolving Montreal Protocol requirements 
and have been so influential at the policy level that Europe has 
achieved the Protocol’s 2020 targets ten years ahead of schedule. 
Shifting energy supply towards renewable sources involves not only 
new knowledge but also making big changes to energy systems and 
policy. Solar PV makes up a small but rapidly growing part of the energy 
system. The Framework Programme has supported technological 
development and demonstration in the area since the 1980s. It has 
expanded the research community in Europe and enabled it to work at 
the global research frontier. National demand-side policies have been 
important in developing solar PV markets but the Commission’s role 
in developing energy policy has also increased since the 1980s. These 
PV-friendly policies have meant that the industry is now demand-led. 
With a 15% share of world production, Europe maintains a strategic 
position in an important and rapidly growing industry that supports 
a large number of small and large firms and well over 100,000 jobs. 
By establishing road maps, funding a range of PV technologies at 
different levels of maturity and linking through demonstration to policy, 
the Framework Programme has enabled Europe to build a strong 
position in current and future PV markets. This eases the transition 
towards renewables and has helped to establish a significant European 
presence in the supply industry. 
The Automotive Industry is one of Europe’s most globally competitive 
sectors, contributing 3% of GDP and accounting for 6% of total 
manufacturing employment and is a sector where policy-push in the 
form of regulations and directives is an important driver for innovation. 
FP-funded research had a very significant effect on the competitive 
position of the European car manufacturing industry, tackling longer-
term high-risk research. Involving the industry in setting the agenda 
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for parts of the FP has allowed the vehicle manufacturers to define 
road maps and build capabilities subsequently to be exploited via in-
house development. In recent decades, the Framework Programme 
has contributed to technological breakthroughs strengthening the 
competitive positioning of the European car manufacturing industry 
- notably in areas of European technological strengths such as engine 
technology, combustion, catalysis, safety and Intelligent Transport 
Systems. FP-funded research has focused on and contributed to 
technological developments with a direct environmental or social 
benefit to the citizen, including research for the improvement of fuel 
consumption, reduction of CO2, elimination of exhaust pollutants, and 
countless improvements of driver safety. A long series of these product 
innovations can be traced back to individual FP-funded projects. An 
example is the effective significant reduction of air pollution thanks to 
the introduction of catalytic converters on passenger cars in Europe at 
the beginning of the 1990s. In automotive, the Framework Programme’s 
role has been to sustain longer-term research and research in areas 
such as fuel efficiency, emissions and safety that create not only private 
advantages for the industry but significant public goods. Exploiting the 
industry’s desire to self-organise to define R&D directions and road maps 
has been a powerful way to coordinate the longer-term R&D effort and 
has supported a long series of product and process innovations that help 
maintain Europe’s position among the global leaders in this industry. 
The Manufuture Technology Platform is of interest more for its potential 
than for any socio-economic impacts achieved so far. The Framework 
programme plays an increasingly catalytic role in integrating and 
strengthening the European research infrastructure, impacting 
industry and research communities. Structural effects promoted by 
the Framework Programme include the creation or strengthening of 
knowledge networks, often evolving into long-term strategic alliances; 
the integration of research and industry communities – cross-sectoral, 
interdisciplinary or transnational; and collaboration networks between 
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and among European and national R&D policy-makers, in a growing 
number of cases resulting in joint-programming of research. Manufuture 
underlines the importance of coordination and self-organisation as 
mechanisms to integrate research. It has defined a research agenda 
about which there is broad agreement in manufacturing industry, 
recruited large numbers of partners and helped define 26 national or 
regional level platforms and is beginning to influence policymaking 
(especially in the area of sustainability) and affect industrial processes. 
At this stage, the longer-term effects of Manufuture are far from 
clear – and understanding them will pose a significant challenge for 
evaluators. However, the Platform is an important instance of the 
shaping and structuring that appears to be one of the Framework 
Programme’s most powerful impact mechanisms. Already at this stage 
it is clear that its influence is enormously far-reaching. 
The most important commonality among these stories is to do 
with coordination by enabling self-organisation. This is a far cry 
from the ‘technology gap’ idea and the associated ‘technology 
push’ model that underlay the early FPs. That does not mean that 
the Framework can evolve into an advisory rather than a funding 
function. If there are no resources there is nothing to coordinate or 
organise. The farmer does not listen to the agricultural extension 
worker because he is wise. The farmer listens to the agricultural 
extension worker because he is wise and brings the subsidy cheque. 
Figure 6 considers the long-term impact categories we defined in the 
analysis of the Framework Programme’s intervention logic (see Figure 
5). In generalising, of course, we lose the subtlety of the individual 
case stories but it is interesting to see that there is a diversity of impact 
patterns.
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Long-term impacts QIPC Brain O3 Solar Auto- Manu-
  Research  PV motive- future
Emergence of new technologies  
or fields of science X X  X
Technological trajectories X   X X
Integration of research  X X X X X X
Cohesion of Europe   X X  X
Diffusion of innovation in  
products, processes or services    X
Strengthened competitive  
position of industry    X X
Innovation in policy-making   X   X
Innovation in the economic sphere    X X X
Our earlier analysis on the Framework Programme’s intervention 
logic tries to describe intended causal links: what causes what. 
Figure 7 (which is undoubtedly not exhaustive) tries to explain how 
such links are made, based on what is visible in the six case studies. 
We can see that the scientifically focused cases contain elements of 
discovery. The Framework is funding serious science and this leads 
in some cases to progress at a quite fundamental or basic level. Of 
course, discovery alone is not all that useful. To have societal effects, 
it must be placed in a wider system that connects it with needs, 
opportunities, production and eventually markets or other competitive 
arenas such as policymaking. In four of the cases, the FP made a 
clear contribution by increasing the volume of knowledge production, 
especially in relation to applications. This can involve ‘translational 
research’ (which ‘pushes’ fundamental knowledge towards 
applications) but perhaps more fundamentally makes connections 
with potential uses and users, often making the mix of work more 
interdisciplinary, since it is usually the case that the closer research gets 
to solving real-life problems the more disciplines need to be involved. 
In one case (QPIC) the Framework Programme appears to have 
made a decisive contribution to the development of a new discipline. 
Figure 6 Long term impacts of the Framework Programmes
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Impact mechanisms QIPC Brain  O3 Solar Auto Manu-
  Research  PV -motive future
Discovery X X X X
Creating new knowledge outputs,  
more generally, especially moving X X X X X
towards applications
Discipline development X
Focusing device in relation to  
innovation    X X X
Agenda-setting X X X X X X
Promoting self-organisation of  
stakeholder communities X X X X X X
Influencing regulations or  
standards X X  X X
Coordinating or influencing policy  X X X X X
Strengthening networks,  
Knowledge Value Collectives;  X  X X X X
defragmenting the research  
community 
Changing research network  
shapes: putting Europe in the X X X X N.A. N.A.
centre 
Levering funding for R&D X X X   X
Mobility and development of  
human capital X X X X X
Research infrastructure  
(Grids, test-beds, etc)   X
Behavioural additionality: learning 
a ‘new’ innovation model  X   X X
Speeding up industry entry into  
new technologies X
Tackling problems too big for  
an individual Member State X X X   X
Addressing areas of major socio- 
economic importance for the EU X X X X X X
Three of the impact mechanisms are examples of ‘arenas’, with the FP 
providing the virtual place in which ideas are interchanged: focusing 
devices; agenda setting; and coordinating or influencing policy. 
Figure 7 Impact Mechanisms in the Case Study Areas
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Nathan Rosenberg coined the term “focusing device”40 for phenomena 
in industrial innovation that focus the attention of innovators on 
problems that they could solve, thereby triggering innovation. We 
have used the term41 in a more specialised way to refer to interactions 
that draw the attention of the research and/or policy communities 
to innovation opportunities that depend on the conduct of research. 
In effect, industry signals ‘there is something here that we need to 
understand better in order to be able to innovate’. We can see examples 
of this happening in the Framework Programme in the three cases 
where there are reasonably well-developed markets. 
All the cases involve agenda setting, typically by creating scientific 
research agendas or technological road maps. These focus the effort 
and increase stakeholders’ willingness to do work and invest by 
reducing uncertainties. In principle, this activity can be risky. What 
if we set the wrong agenda? In practice, these things are regularly 
discussed, revisited and modified. In the case of technology road 
maps, there are often several adequate potential solutions and a large 
part of the value of the road map is that it represents an agreement 
that everyone will work on one of them. Of prime importance is that 
the coordination is not done by the Commission but by the stakeholder 
communities themselves. The value added of the FP is to encourage 
and provide a setting in which that self-organisation can happen.
A similar logic applies to influencing regulation or standards, which 
is a mechanism also visible among the cases. These help define how 
markets work, so naturally industry tends to be especially interested in 
his impact mechanism. 
40 Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology, Cambridge University Press, 1976 
41 Erik Arnold, Barbara Good and Henrik Segerpalm, Effects of Research on Swedish Mobile Telephone 
 Developments: The GSM Story, VA 2008:04, Stockholm, VENNOVA, 2008
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There is also a strong bidirectional link between the FP and policy. This 
can involve research results influencing policy, as is especially clear 
in the Ozone case, or policy influencing research, as with emissions 
requirements for vehicles. In the detail, even these apparently one-way 
flows are in fact two-way. Emissions policy is constrained by what is 
technically possible just as the problems of incrementally improving 
the Montreal Protocol raises research questions. 
Strengthening networks has been recognised as a key function of 
the Framework Programme since the beginning. The scientific cases 
show that this is especially important in newer fields and that it is 
correspondingly harder to make a difference in established ones, even 
though there may still be good reasons for investing in such established 
areas. Network relations can be commercial as well as technical. One 
of the most important aspects is the creation of a large cadre of people 
in industry and in the knowledge infrastructure who understand and 
work with digital communications – what Bozeman and Rogers42 call 
a Knowledge Value Collective. By this they mean a social configuration 
able to produce knowledge value. Conventionally, we try to count the 
benefits of an intervention such as a research programme in the industrial 
world by looking at its effects on institutions. But to a considerable 
extent, the community of people who work with a technology persists 
more strongly than institutions, especially companies. 
The scientometric work strongly suggested that the Framework 
Programme has enabled European actors to become more central 
and therefore influential and powerful in R&D networks. This can be 
expected both to create advantage and to move the European research 
fabric towards the ERA vision. 
42 Barry Bozeman and Juan Rogers, ‘A churn model of scientific knowledge value: Internet researchers as a  
 knowledge value collective,’ Research Policy, (31), 2002, pp 769-794
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With most FP projects involving cost sharing, the Framework 
Programme rests heavily on the idea of using EU money to ‘leverage’ 
contributions from project participants. However, well before the 
attempts to coordinate or leverage national money via the ERA-
NETs and more recently the Joint Programming Initiatives, our cases 
show that the FP was aligning funding and activity at national level. 
Mobility and the role of the FP as a ‘training school’ for the research 
community are impact mechanisms that for accidental reasons are 
not much in focus in our case studies but whose importance is well 
understood, even if their longer-term effects are not well explored. 
From time to time, there have been important examples of the 
Framework Programme organising test beds and other shared facilities 
that generate European Added Value. There are old examples in ESPRIT 
and RACE as well as new ones in Grid Computing and ESFRI. In our 
cases, this dimension did not often appear – the main example being 
the coordination of infrastructure in the stratospheric Ozone field, 
especially in connection with the large data collection campaigns. 
The importance of infrastructure as an impact mechanism should 
nonetheless not be neglected. 
Especially in industry, the Framework Programme appears to have been 
instrumental in achieving change through the use of a more ‘open’ 
model of innovation. Once the tradition of collaboration is established, 
coordination and self-organisation through activities like road mapping 
become easier. This openness appears to have been important in 
introducing QPIC research to industrial partners at a very early stage, 
both so that they could learn and because this would provide focus to 
the research, which was ultimately aimed at applications in computing 
and communications. 
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In at least four of our cases, the Framework Programme partly 
achieved its impact because it was uniquely positioned to do the job: 
the problems at hand were simply too big to be tackled at the national 
level. In all the cases, a key reason that the Framework Programme 
was able to be influential was a widespread recognition of the socio-
economic importance of the field. 
If we relate the Framework Programme back to changes in our 
perspective on innovation systems, we can see that it is evolving in 
ways that are consistent with that understanding. 
• It does not provide the simple stimuli implied by the linear models 
but is a complex intervention addressing research and innovation 
networks and systems
• As a pre-competitive, open innovation initiative, it transfers a lot of 
knowledge into and out of the stock of knowledge, an activity that 
inherently has high spillovers
• Its increasing focus on coordination and re-optimising the European 
innovation system at the European level helps break national lock-
ins and provides a way to increase the rate of innovation
• Increasingly, it connects research and innovation to other concerns, 
moving towards a holistic approach to policy
• While its funding does tackle market failure, the main thrust of the 
Framework is towards tackling systems failure
• To this extent, it tends inter alia to occupy the policy ‘space’ formerly 
inhabited by the development pairs that no longer are viable
• By empowering stakeholder groups to develop and exploit their 
own strategic intelligence within a wider policy framework, it 
captures and exploits the power of self-organisation rather than 
central planning
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5. what next?
Future RTD policy at the European level will become more holistic, 
combining innovation and research policy to a greater degree, even 
if we do not see the kind of government-wide integrative governance 
mechanisms visible at national level. The role of coordination seems 
likely to become even more important, posing important problems 
of management and governance. Understanding the continuing and 
longer term impacts of EU policy at this level will require innovation 
in governance mechanisms and in newer kinds of evaluation tools 
that can take better account of governance and other longer-term 
mechanisms and effects. 
5.1	 Policy
At the time of writing, the future of the Framework Programme is 
formally undecided. The design of FP8 has yet to be agreed and the 
budget has yet to be requested. Informally, much is already clear. The 
Commission’s intention is to merge the RTD Framework Programme 
with the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) 
in an over-arching programme to be called ‘Horizon 2020’. This will 
include not only the Frameworks but also the wider range of ‘ERA 
Instruments’ that sit outside the Framework Programmes and it will be 
backed up in 2012 by a directive that aims to reduce legal barriers to the 
ERA and the operation of Europe as a ‘common market’ for knowledge 
as well as goods and services. Hopefully, this represents a move 
towards greater holism in EU-level research and innovation policies. 
With growing budgets, DG-Research has experienced major 
bottlenecks in administration, as it has not been allowed to increase 
staff in line with the budget rises. This lies behind the creation of an 
executive agency to handle administration and the growing use of 
large, decentralised instruments. 
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A recurring theme is the use by the Commission of new measures 
that leverage or ‘structure’ the spending of Member State  resources. 
This not only extends the Commission’s sphere of influence but also 
begins to change the structure of cooperation in the FP, with Member 
States increasingly participating ‘à la carte’ in a series of international 
cooperations. 
For both administrative and policy reasons, therefore, Commission 
research and innovation policy are moving from inclusive measures, 
where the entire Union can compete in an arena defined top down, 
to more self-organised measures, into which stakeholders must 
elect themselves –  and in doing so having to pass various informal 
tests of trust and membership of relevant stakeholder communities. 
Since membership of these networks is substantially based on 
track record, this shift may make it even more difficult for the FP 
to include capacity building measures. This contrasts with some of 
the earlier achievements of the FP, for example in establishing and 
strengthening academic research capacities in IT in Greece and Ireland. 
The multiplication of efforts within the Commission leads to the need 
for multiple responses at national level. Agencies and R&D performers 
alike will find it increasingly hard to keep up with the proliferation of 
policies and measures.
5.2	 Evaluating	and	understanding	the	Framework	Programme
Broadly, we can conclude that the evaluation record tells us little 
about the achievement of high-level (policy) objectives, some things 
about specific or strategic objectives and quite a lot about operational 
objectives. Our hypothesis is that, if we can identify and understand 
more about impact mechanisms, it will be easier to trace not only the 
longer term but also the higher-level performance of the Framework 
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Programme. This provides an important research agenda in governance, 
management and evaluation. 
Looking at the past Framework Programme evaluation process and 
methods, it is clear that these determine many aspects of what 
we can and cannot see when we try to understand FP impacts.. 
The growing professionalisation of evaluation has contributed to 
making it more systematic – but has probably reinforced the tendency 
of New Public Management-style close-coupling of evaluation to the 
programming cycle to abstract from the technical content of the FP. As 
a result, we say a lot about the generalities (“knowledge and networks”) 
but lose sight of the specific technical achievements and how these 
relate to movements in the technology frontier and changes in markets. 
The low rate of methodological innovation in the evaluation record is 
striking. On one level, this should not be a surprise. Evaluation is a 
profession more than a research discipline and professionals win the 
contest for work by offering tried and tested formulae while evaluation 
customers have good organisational reasons for being risk-averse. 
The close link between the timing of evaluation and the programming 
cycle means that evaluators’ attention is effectively directed towards 
short-term phenomena –  some of which are still in process. This in 
turn forces the use of participant perception as the ‘lens’ through 
which to evaluate and excludes the use of many other techniques 
that would be relevant with a longer-term perspective. Where new 
approaches have been tried, the returns have not always been very 
good. Notably, Social Network Analysis is increasingly used to describe 
the FP but has yet to yield many results that tell us how it works. 
Linking FP data to other datasets appears promising because aspects 
of these external databases tell us about performance. However, such 
approaches require a radical increase in the ‘cleanliness’ and inclusivity 
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of FP databases. In some cases they can run into data protection 
problems because they involve using data for purposes other than 
those for which they were collected. 
Case studies provide a rich way to get a qualitative understanding 
of FP impacts. They require some understanding of the fields 
they address and the ability for the researcher to move with the 
twists and turns of emerging evidence rather than solely relying on 
standardised techniques. The stories they generate can be confirmed 
by having participants and observers validate them but they are 
inevitably stories, lacking the satisfactory solid feel that numbers give. 
Mixing scientometric and qualitative techniques turns out to be 
quite difficult. A key issue is matching the level of granularity. 
Cluster analysis proved unable to identify a level that made cognitive 
sense (ie one at which you can understand and tell stories) while 
the level of historical logic visible in the cases could not accurately 
be reflected in the scientometric work. Thus the match between 
the scope of the bibliometrics and the case studies is approximate. 
Further progress in understanding longer-term impacts of the 
Framework Programme including, in particular, its success in 
reaching higher-level policy objectives can be aided by treating 
some of the impact mechanisms identified here as hypotheses 
and exploring them in particular instances. These mechanisms 
are largely not amenable to an aggregate statistical analysis, so we 
will need bigger, deeper studies of individual examples. Different 
parts of the Framework Programme work in different ways – large-
scale surveys that ignore this fact will not help us learn much more. 
Increasing our understanding of the long-term impacts of the 
Framework Programme – and, by extension, of this style of large-scale 
intervention – requires some progress in methods. 
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First, we need more methodological experimentation. Established 
methods suitable for answering the short-term evaluation questions 
generated by the programming cycle may be as good as it gets for 
answering such questions –  but are inadequate to the longer term. 
Getting a better understanding will require taking bigger methodological 
risks, recognising that not everything will work and therefore that in the 
short-term evaluation and study results will become more expensive. 
Second, we need to maintain the use of multiple methods – none of the 
tools we can use to understand the Framework is robust in isolation, so 
we are forced to triangulate. 
A key issue in understanding the Framework is linking micro-
behaviour and macro-phenomena. For example, the increasing use 
of Social Network Analysis has led to a growing number of network 
diagrams appearing in evaluation reports whose operational meaning 
is essentially unknown. We simply lack a way to link the logic of what 
people do in networks with the network analyses. Without such an 
understanding, the network analysis lacks both diagnostic power and 
policy relevance. 
Much of the Framework Programme evaluation tradition treats 
‘projects’ as general and generalisable phenomena. The casework 
described here underlines the importance of the specificities of 
individual technologies, markets and scientific communities. It 
illustrates the need to (re)engage with the Framework Programme on 
a more technologically and scientifically specific and iterate level in 
order to understand its operation. 
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Finally, we have to pay a lot more attention to context. Not least, 
since the study of long term impacts supports the tendency of the 
Commission to move towards explicit coordination, we need to 
connect what happens in the Framework Programme with other 
policies, market and technological changes. 
Prof. Erik Arnold
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